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Laboratory studies of social visual cognition often simulate the critical aspects of joint
attention by having participants interact with a computer-generated avatar. Recently,
there has been a movement toward examining these processes during authentic social
interaction. In this review, we will focus on attention to faces, attentional misdirection, and
a phenomenon we have termed social inhibition of return (Social IOR), that have revealed
aspects of social cognition that were hitherto unknown. We attribute these discoveries
to the use of paradigms that allow for more realistic social interactions to take place. We
also point to an area that has begun to attract a considerable amount of interest—that of
Theory of Mind (ToM) and automatic perspective taking—and suggest that this too might
benefit from adopting a similar approach.
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SOCIAL ATTENTION: THE NEED FOR REAL SOCIAL
INTERACTION
Ever since its inception during the late 1960s (e.g., Neisser, 1967),
research into human visual attention has moved toward examin-
ing the behavior of individuals as they perform tasks alone. In the
standard experiment a single observer is seated in front of a visual
display and performs a required task. Clearly, this laboratory-
based paradigm has been instrumental in uncovering many of
the fundamental properties of visual cognition (e.g., Eriksen
and Eriksen, 1974; Posner, 1980; Duncan, 1984; Tipper, 1985;
Raymond et al., 1992; Watson and Humphreys, 1997; Simons
and Rensink, 2005). However, humans are social animals and the
majority of people spend some part of each day interacting with
others. As this issue of Frontiers demonstrates, a growing num-
ber of visual cognition studies are beginning to reflect this and
examine how attention is deployed when a person interacts with
another individual or individuals. In this article we first present
our own assessment of why the new field of social neuroscience
can be considered as more than an attempt to improve the ecolog-
ical validity of our experiments. We then go on to show how the
social neuroscience method not only informs us about the mental
processes involved in social interaction but has also revealed the
existence of visual mechanisms that were previously unknown.
Indeed, we cite particular cases where the method has revealed
effects previously thought not to occur. Examples are drawn from
our own research examining attention to faces, attentional mis-
direction, and a phenomenon we have previously labeled social
inhibition of return (SIOR). Finally, we point to one recent debate
that could likely benefit from this new approach. That is the ques-
tion of whether Theory of Mind (ToM) and perspective-taking
are automatic processes.
The study of social attention is often considered to have
begun in the late 1990s with the first report of the gaze cue-
ing effect (Friesen and Kingstone, 1998) in which a person’s
attention is oriented on the basis of another person’s direction
of gaze. However, it is more accurate to say that developmen-
tal psychologists have been studying these types of phenomena
for decades and, as with the developing field of social neu-
roscience, their methods involved measuring behavior during
interaction between real people. An early example (Scaife and
Bruner, 1975) involved young infants sitting with a caregiver and
looking directly ahead toward an experimenter. The experimenter
would then turn their head 90◦ to the left or right and fixate an
object. The infant’s propensity for gaze following would then be
recorded. This line of work was subsequently placed within the
context of ToM in which infants were assessed for their ability to
understand others as intentional agents (Tomasello et al., 1993).
The lead that developmental psychologists have taken in study-
ing infant cognition in the real world is beginning to find favor
amongst those advocating a cognitive ethological approach to adult
cognition (Kingstone et al., 2008). Ethology, the study of animal
behavior, was developed by a number of naturalists in Europe
during the 1930s. Its central position was that animal “routines”
and “patterns” should be examined in as natural environment as
possible. Ethology’s basic philosophy explicitly contrasted with
that of the American-led Behaviorists during the same period.
Their models of behavior were derived from laboratory studies
of animals, usually rats and pigeons. Although many influen-
tial models of behavior were developed from the behaviorist
approach, the field was often criticized for its lack of ecolog-
ical validity. In the same way, cognitive ethologists emphasize
the importance of ecological factors in human cognition and
consider social interaction as being central. Although social neu-
roscience does not advocate a naturalistic setting per se, the field
does employ paradigms that take into consideration the social
situations in which cognition occurs.
A number of recent attention researchers have therefore
examined adult visual attention in scenarios where participants
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org June 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 196 | 1
HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE
Skarratt et al. Visual attention during real social interaction
perform tasks in conjunction with other individuals. For instance,
Brennan et al. (2008) made the point that many everyday sit-
uations involve joint visual search, such as when an adult and
child look through a picture book together. With this in mind,
Brennan et al. examined whether joint visual search might be
more efficient than that of a solitary observer. Pairs of partic-
ipants were asked to search arrays for a target letter appearing
amongst distractors, with cursors allowing each participant to see
the location of their partner’s gaze at any point during the search.
Results showed that searches were almost twice as efficient when
made jointly than alone. Furthermore, Brennan et al. showed that
observers coordinated their search with their partner’s without
explicit training. The authors concluded that joint gaze can be
used spontaneously to minimize collective effort and optimize
search success.
The acknowledgment that psychological models can benefit
from ecological consideration can be seen in other areas of vision
research, as in the case of vision and action. The study of visual
perception has been dominated by the view that the function
of vision is to generate a representation of the external environ-
ment. That is, to provide a percept. However, a number of authors
have pointed out that vision is most often accompanied by action
(e.g., Milner and Goodale, 1995; Prinz, 1997; Jeannerod, 1999;
Hommel, 2009) and paradigms have therefore been developed
with this in mind. For instance, an abundance of work has shown
that the appearance of a new object is particularly effective in
attracting attention (e.g., Cole et al., 2004; Cole and Liversedge,
2006; Cole et al., 2007; Davoli et al., 2007; Cole and Kuhn, 2009,
2010; Yantis and Jonides, 1984). However, Welsh and Pratt (2006)
demonstrated that the propensity with which new onsets cap-
ture attention is influenced by the type of action an individual
makes when responding to them. More specifically, the authors
showed that task-irrelevant offsets interfere with new object cap-
ture when a standard keyboard press is required but do not when
a reaching response is made. Thus the act of reaching toward
an object enables attention to be focused more effectively. As is
the case with social neuroscience, proponents of the vision-for-
action perspective argue that a phenomenon in question may be
better elucidated when consideration is given to its functional
significance in the real world.
Social neuroscience is clearly grounded in the notion that
humans are social animals and this ought to be reflected in our
experimental paradigms. In the field of visual attention the social
aspect of this process has typically been implemented by present-
ing participants with social stimuli in the form of static images or
video clips of people, and then measuring their effects on visual
attention. The use of these often well controlled, yet rather reduc-
tionist depictions of real world stimuli offer a valuable tool to
investigate social attention in the laboratory. This is particularly
the case in the field of neuroscience, where experimental proto-
cols are often limited by the logistical constraints of the apparatus
(e.g., MRI, EEG; but for recent developments see Guionnet et al.,
2012; Guionnet et al., and Schippers et al., 2010). Progress in
overcoming these constraints has allowed face-to-face interaction
between people by channeling a live video feed inside a scanner.
In one such experiment, Redcay et al. (2010) recorded functional
MRI data as participants interacted with an experimenter via a
video screen in one of three cooperative scenarios: a “live” interac-
tion, a recording of one of their earlier interactions, or a recording
of the experimenter’s interaction with a different participant.
Hence, all three conditions contained identical visual informa-
tion but differed according to the mental state imputed to the
experimenter’s actions. Results showed that the live feed elicited
greater activation in the ventral striatum, amygdala, and ante-
rior cingulate cortex (ACC), areas activated in studies of social
reward (e.g., Walter et al., 2005), and the right posterior superior
temporal sulcus (rpSTS), a region implicated in social percep-
tion and social cognition (Allison et al., 2000; Saxe, 2006). That
these brain regions are differentially activated on the basis of the
authenticity of face-to-face interactions leads one to enquire as
to their importance. Are such areas central or peripheral to the
processes we as experimenters attempt to measure in our stud-
ies of social visual cognition? How does their involvement impact
upon processes occurring elsewhere in the brain? Do they scale up
to produce measurable differences in behavior? And the question
most pertinent to the current review: Are the processes that medi-
ate perception of these social stimuli the same as those involved
in perceiving a real person? Hence, it is not merely a matter of
improving the ecological validity of our experiments; it is about
the extent to which the findings from social attention studies
translate to real person interaction. If these processes differ, it is
likely to have serious implications for our understanding of social
attention, and social neuroscience in general. In the next section
we compare examples of what we have learned about social atten-
tion from classical behavioral studies and from those in which real
people interact. We find that the former can yield very different
results from the latter.
ATTENTIONAL ORIENTING TOWARD OTHER PEOPLE
Rather than processing all of the available sensory input, the
visual system selects only that which is likely to be behaviorally
important. Metaphors such as the attentional spotlight (Posner
et al., 1980; Broadbent, 1982) or zoom-lens (Eriksen and St.
James, 1986) describe the way in which attention is oriented
around the field of vision, selecting for further processing any
objects or locations falling within the “illuminated” boundary.
Attentional orienting can be overt (i.e., where people look), or
covert (i.e., where people attend without moving their eyes or
head). Given the importance that attention plays in mediating
what we see, it is not surprising that there has been much inter-
est in determining how we select the information deemed to
be “important” (Henderson, 2003). Some have argued that this
selection process is largely driven by bottom-up stimulus features
(e.g., Itti and Koch, 2000). According to these models, certain
stimulus features, such as luminance contrasts, are particularly
salient and thus automatically capture attention. Detailed com-
putational models are remarkably accurate in predicting people’s
eye movements as they view images of natural scenes (Itti and
Koch, 2001). However, due to the complexity of the processes they
attempt to simulate, these models necessarily simplify humans
as passive observers of the world (Findlay and Gilchrist, 2003).
In reality, however, vision is an active process that enables us
to carry out multifarious tasks in which required objects might
not be the most salient aspect of the visual scene (Land, 2006).
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Consequently, others have argued that eye movements are driven
by our top-down goals rather than by salient aspects of the visual
scene (Land et al., 1999; Hayhoe and Ballard, 2005; Land, 2006).
This reinforces the view outlined in the previous section that
vision and action are intricately linked.
In addition to task goals and bottom-up salience, it has become
clear that the attention system is strongly influenced by social fac-
tors. Some of the earliest eye tracking studies by Yarbus (1967)
have shown that whilst viewing images of social situations our
eyes are particularly attracted by the people in the scene. More
recent studies have replicated this observation and shown further
that attention is strongly drawn toward faces, and in particu-
lar the eyes (Yarbus, 1967; Kuhn and Land, 2006; Birmingham
et al., 2008b, 2009; Fletcher-Watson et al., 2008; Kuhn et al., 2009).
Indeed, such is the appeal of eyes that observers still tend to look
at them even when faces are presented in isolation (Walker-Smith
et al., 1977; Pelphrey et al., 2002; Itier et al., 2007).
However, to what extent do these findings generalize to more
complex social interactions? Most studies of face perception
involve faces presented in isolation and are, as a consequence,
already attended (Walker-Smith et al., 1977; Pelphrey et al., 2002).
Hence these studies may demonstrate a preference for the eyes
because these are often the most complex or salient component of
a pre-selected face. The true measure of eye-preference is whether
they are able to summon attention when faces are embedded
within a complex scene. Evidence has shown that this is indeed the
case (Birmingham et al., 2008a,b, 2009). Although those studies
used static scenes, others have investigated where observers look
in dynamic scenes. For instance, Kuhn et al. (2009) had partici-
pants observe a magician performing a magic trick. In spite of the
trick involving the magician’s hands, the proportion of fixations
on his head and eyes was close to 70%. Likewise, when partici-
pants were asked to watch videos of other students engaging in
conversation, 77% of fixations were directed to the people in the
clips (Foulsham et al., 2010).
Much empirical work has therefore demonstrated that as
humans, we generally prioritize other humans, their faces and, in
particular, their eyes when viewing natural scenes. Whilst these
studies vary in terms of their ecological validity, there remain
questions as to whether these studies capture the true nature of
social cognition. Indeed, social cognition involves more than pas-
sively observing images of people; it involves interaction with real
people. Interestingly, there is evidence that even the potential for
real social interaction can influence behavior. For example, peo-
ple will often meet the gaze of an approaching stranger that is
depicted in an image (Henderson et al., 2005; Itier et al., 2007) but
will avoid direct eye contact when the same event occurs in real
life (Ellsworth et al., 1972). Hence the presence of a real person
clearly elicits a different behavioral response. The main differ-
ence between these settings is that the latter involves the potential
for social interaction whilst the former does not. A recent study
by Laidlaw et al. (2011) directly examined the effect of those
two scenarios. In the study, participants’ eye movements were
monitored as they sat in a waiting room. The crucial manipu-
lation in the experiment was whether participants were joined
by a real confederate posing as another research participant or
the confederate appearing on a video screen in the waiting room.
Results showed that whereas participants frequently looked at
the confederate on the video screen, they rarely did so in per-
son. Moreover, ratings of the participants’ social skills correlated
positively with the amount of time spent looking at the live con-
federate, yet did not in the video condition. Similar conclusions
concerning the difference between real and artificial social inter-
actions have been drawn from studies examining eye movements
in response to social cues in autism (e.g., Nation and Penny,
2008).
In sum, it is clear that attempts to measure aspects of social
cognition can yield different results depending on whether the
social context is real or merely simulated. The majority of
research demonstrates that our willingness to look at others
is strongly influenced by whether or not they are physically
present. Although traditional, controlled, computer-based tasks
are important in examining some of the mechanisms involved
in social attention, its underlying mechanisms may only be fully
understood in more naturalistic settings that take into account
how we interact with other people.
ATTENTIONAL ORIENTING AWAY FROM OTHER
PEOPLE: GAZE FOLLOWING
Eyes are not only highly effective in attracting attention, but also
in orienting attention to other parts of the visual field indicated
by their gaze direction. This orienting response to where other
people look has been termed gaze following or gaze cueing and
has been studied extensively since the late 1990s (Friesen and
Kingstone, 1998; Driver et al., 1999). In these experiments, partic-
ipants are typically presented with a face in the centre of a display
with its eyes and/or head directed to the left or right. A target
is then presented at either the gazed-at location or the opposite
hemifield. The characteristic results are that response times are
reduced for targets appearing in the gaze-indicated position, a
facilitatory effect arising from the gaze cue having automatically
shifted the observers’ attention. In the years since this discovery,
many variations of this paradigm have been developed to deter-
mine the parameters of gaze cueing and its underlying neural
bases (Williams et al., 2005; Frischen et al., 2007; Materna et al.,
2008).
Even though gaze cues are intended to represent real human
faces, it has been argued that the paradigm may not necessar-
ily capture the true nature of social attention (Kingstone et al.,
2003, 2008; Kingstone, 2009). Although some researchers have
tried to address this concern by improving the realism of the
images used in their experiments (e.g., Hermens and Walker,
2010), the very nature of simulating social interaction via a com-
puter monitor is questionable (Kingstone, 2009). Hence other
researchers have begun to examine gaze following in more nat-
uralistic settings whereby target locations are cued by real people.
For instance, Gallup et al. (2012a) used a hidden video cam-
era to record the number of glances received by an attractive
stimulus as pedestrians walked by. The critical measure con-
cerned whether a pedestrian’s gaze would increase the likelihood
of other passers-by glancing toward the stimulus. This was indeed
the case. Moreover, this likelihood was greater for those who
walked behind the pedestrian than for those who approached
from the front. This finding is consistent with the notion of
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gaze avoidance by approaching strangers (Ellsworth et al., 1972),
and demonstrates that the effectiveness of a visual cue in direct-
ing attention can be modulated by the social context (see also
Gallup et al., 2012b, for gaze following in large crowds of people).
Kuhn and colleagues have adopted a similar ethological approach
to examining visual cognition by recording the eye movements
of observers as they watch magic tricks (for reviews see Kuhn
et al., 2008; Macknik et al., 2008; Kuhn and Martinez, 2012).
Magicians are highly skilled in directing—and misdirecting—the
attention of observers. Social cues play a crucial role in misdirec-
tion, and numerous studies have now demonstrated that gaze cues
are instrumental in successfully achieving this (Kuhn and Land,
2006; Tatler and Kuhn, 2007; Kuhn et al., 2009; but see Cui et al.,
2011). For instance, Kuhn et al. (2009) found that the magicians’
gaze influenced where people looked, and consequently the likeli-
hood of successful detection (see also Tatler and Kuhn, 2007). The
advantage of this over the standard gaze cueing paradigm is not
only are the cues generated in a more naturalistic way, but that
they also compete against other salient features in the visual scene
as well as the participant’s intention to discover the trick. These
paradigms therefore offer a significant step toward investigating
attention in a more realistic social context. Importantly how-
ever, attempts have been made to improve the ecological validity
still further by comparing the likelihood of trick detection when
observed on a video or in a live setting (Kuhn and Tatler, 2005;
Tatler and Kuhn, 2007). These have indicated that misdirection
experienced during a face-to-face interaction is more effective,
suggesting that social cues are stronger when presented by a real
person. Moreover, the instructions concerning what participants
would expect to see in the face-to-face scenario did not influence
their eye movement behavior, nor did it improve their detection
of the trick (Kuhn and Tatler, 2005). However, when viewed on a
computer monitor, prior instructions influenced both detection
as well as eye movement behavior (Kuhn et al., 2008).
In sum, whilst the gaze cueing paradigm has been immensely
valuable in investigating different aspects of social attention, there
is a clear difference in the way attention operates in the presence
of real people as opposed to simulated people. We now turn to
further evidence of this in the next section.
SOCIAL INHIBITION OF RETURN (SIOR)
Another example of how the presence of others influences atten-
tion is the way inhibition of return (IOR) is expressed during
individual and joint visual search tasks. Indeed, the differences
are such that Skarratt et al. (2010) have proposed that IOR and its
social counterpart social IOR may even be independent processes
rather than facets of the same processes as revealed in social and
solitary search contexts.
IOR refers to the slowing of responses to targets appearing in
previously attended locations (Kingstone and Pratt, 1999; Taylor
and Klein, 2000; Godijn and Theeuwes, 2002). It has been pro-
posed as having evolved as a means of expediting visual search
(Klein and MacInnes, 1999). To this end, inhibitory mechanisms
serve to bias attention from returning to previously inspected
locations, and to discourage successive eye-movements being
programmed to the same spatial location (Rafal et al., 1989). One
can imagine the utility of such mechanisms during a search for
a friend in a crowd of people. The search is less likely to yield
a successful outcome if attentional and saccadic resources are
repeatedly realigned with spatial locations that have recently been
searched. However, as social animals, we are likely to have car-
ried out many of our predatory and defensive search behaviors
in conjunction with other individuals. This raises the interesting
question of whether one might inhibit a spatial location know-
ing that another person has previously searched there. This very
rationale motivated Welsh and colleagues (Welsh et al., 2005)
to examine whether IOR can be socially “transferred” between
different individuals. This was investigated by having pairs of par-
ticipants sit across a table from one another. Each took turns
at reaching out to one of two targets as they appeared on the
workspace. The basic social IOR phenomenon is the observa-
tion that participants are slower to initiate a reaching action
to a location previously responded to by a partner. That is
to say, one inhibits a location on the basis that another per-
son has searched there. As such, it can be said that IOR can
indeed be “transferred” between two individuals. This effect is
clearly a visual phenomenon based on real social interaction.
However, not only has this paradigm revealed information con-
cerning such interaction but, as the following two sections show,
the procedure also reveals aspects of visual attention previously
unknown.
SOCIAL IOR AND NEW INSIGHTS INTO HUMAN COGNITION
THE ROLE OF VISIBLE TRANSIENTS
Skarratt et al. (2010) sought to investigate the extent to which
social IOR is generated on the basis of social information rather
than the visual information carried by another person’s responses.
If it is the former, then it ought to occur when participants sim-
ply know where their partner has responded without having seen
it take place. To address this possibility, the view each participant
had of their partner was restricted to a central portion measur-
ing 12◦ across. All peripheral information was occluded, meaning
participants could not see their partner’s targets, response buttons
and, consequently, the completion of their responses. In other
words, all the visual information that could give rise to IOR at
the response location was eliminated. White noise also masked
the sound of the response buttons being pressed, thus preclud-
ing the likelihood of IOR occurring due to auditory stimulation
(cf. Spence and Driver, 1998). This meant that participants could
infer a response location only from their partner’s eye gaze (sig-
naling their intention to respond), or their initial handmovement
toward the target. Results showed that social IOR emerged even
under these restricted viewing conditions. Moreover, it was the
same magnitude as the corresponding IOR effect observed under
free-viewing conditions, to which all the sensory information had
contributed. Thus, simply knowing where a person had responded
was as effective as seeing the complete reaching response.
The implication of these findings is that a visual cognition
effect, mediated in this case by inhibitory processes, is initiated
by inferred events occurring in the external world. Importantly,
this contrasts markedly with what was previously assumed about
IOR from classical precueing studies in which participants per-
form alone. For instance, Cole et al. (2011a) showed that even
when observers are aware that an occluded visual event has taken
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place in a spatial location, they do not inhibit it. The experi-
ment involved participants having to detect a target appearing
in a cued or uncued location. On some trials, a luminance cue
indicated the possible target location. On others, a pattern mask
briefly occluded the cue onset, but the indicated target location
was revealed after the mask was removed. Thus, in both cases
a precue indicated the potential target location, but only in one
case did the participant see the cue generated. Results showed
that IOR emerged only when the cue transient was visible, indi-
cating that localized sensory input is required for inhibition to
occur. Indeed, these findings concur with a great deal of evi-
dence suggesting that local transients are necessary for attention
to be marshaled at all. Using a similar method to occlude lower
level visual transients, Franconeri et al. (2005) examined whether
new perceptual objects can capture attention without an abrupt
visual onset. To this end, they used a standard irrelevant single-
ton paradigm (Egeth and Yantis, 1997) comparing search slopes
yielded by new versus already present targets. An annulus shape
was presented around the perimeter of the array, which then con-
tracted during the course of each trial. As the shape contracted,
the new object appeared behind and was then revealed in a loca-
tion previously seen to be unoccupied. As with Cole et al. (2011a),
participants were aware that a scene change had taken place, but
had not seen the accompanying transient that signaled its arrival.
Results showed that new objects failed to capture attention under
these conditions, yet they did attract attention when the annulus
was seen to move behind the search items thus rendering a visible
onset (but see Cole et al., 2011a, Experiment 6). In a similar vein,
Skarratt et al. (submitted) have shown that attention is captured
by objects that loom towards or recede away from the observer
(see also Skarratt et al., 2009). These objects began their motion
paths in far and near depth planes, respectively, before moving
into alignment with objects remaining static throughout the trial.
However, when the motion sequence was replaced with a blank
frame, thus removing the transients associated with the objects’
movement path, these objects were no longer capable of attract-
ing attention. In the case of social IOR, however, spatial locations
undergo inhibitory tagging on the basis of knowing rather than
seeing that a stimulus event has taken place.
DO CENTRAL CUES ELICIT IOR?
That social IOR occurs under restricted viewing conditions indi-
cates that peripheral locations can be inhibited on the basis of
centrally presented information. This contrasts with IOR, whose
emergence in a peripheral location requires a localized periph-
eral cue, and which is not reliably observed when a peripheral
location is indicated by a central arrow cue. Like peripheral cues,
central arrows can facilitate processing when they precede a tar-
get by a short interval (Ristic et al., 2002; Tipples, 2002) yet they
do not give rise to later IOR (Posner and Cohen, 1984; Abrams
and Dobkin, 1994). Hence there is a clear difference in the effects
of central cueing in a conventional precueing paradigm and in
a social IOR paradigm. Indeed, this discrepancy becomes even
more apparent when examining the effects of gaze cues. As we
described earlier, attention can be oriented by the gaze direction
of centrally presented faces. They too result in prolonged facil-
itation that rarely gives way to subsequent IOR (McKee et al.,
2007; Greene et al., 2009). As far as we are aware, only two studies
have shown IOR in response to gaze cues. According to Frischen
et al. (2007; see also Frischen and Tipper, 2004), gaze cues do
give rise to IOR but at much later cue-target intervals than can
be observed with peripheral cues (around 2400ms rather than
300ms), and only when attention is disengaged from the gazed-at
location prior to target presentation. The highly specific circum-
stances in which gaze cues elicit IOR are in contrast with those
in which social IOR occurs. For instance, Skarratt et al. (2010;
Experiment 3) ensured that each participant saw only their part-
ner’s face as they performed the alternating response task. This
provided a very close approximation of the classic gaze-cueing
method in that the partner looked toward their response location
after which the participant’s own target appeared in the same or
opposite location. The results showed reliable social IOR occur-
ring much earlier (i.e., between 1300–1700ms) than the IOR
effect found by Frischen et al., and without a controlled attempt
to remove attention from the gazed-at location. These findings
suggest that the mechanisms underlying attention and inhibition
respond differently to real and simulated biological behavior.
REAL VERSUS ANIMATED BIOLOGICAL BEHAVIOR
This point is further underscored by our attempts to induce social
IOR using a realistic animation of a person’s response behavior.
In this experiment (Skarratt et al., 2010, Experiment 1), indi-
vidual participants performed the alternating response task in
conjunction with an animated partner. This was achieved by
projecting a movie of a male partner onto a screen such that
he appeared to be seated opposite. In keeping with our other
experiments, we disambiguated the social and visual information
conveyed by the partner’s response by manipulating the partici-
pants’ view of him. Results showed the inhibitory effect occurred
only when participants had an unrestricted view of the animated
partner’s responses, indicating that IOR was elicited by the asso-
ciated lower level visual transients. The absence of social IOR in
the restricted viewing condition suggests that the visuomotor sys-
tem is less sensitive to simulated biological behavior than it is to
the same behavior performed by a real person. Hence the crit-
ical factor in the generation of social IOR is that the observed
behavior must demonstrate agency. This view is supported by
several recent findings revealing different neural substrates for
the perception of real and virtually real biological behavior. For
instance, Gobbini et al. (2011) compared the BOLD responses
of participants observing either human or robot faces perform-
ing basic emotional expressions. Perhaps unsurprisingly, both
face types activated face-specialized regions such as the fusiform
gyrus and the superior temporal sulcus. More interesting, how-
ever, was that human faces evoked stronger activations in the
medial prefrontal and the anterior temporal cortices, and the
right amygdala. The latter system has long been associated with
emotion (Breiter et al., 1996; Morris et al., 1996), suggesting par-
ticipants were less sensitive to automated displays of emotion,
whilst the former regions are thought to be involved in the repre-
sentation of others’ mental states and ToM (Leibenluft et al., 2004;
Mitchell et al., 2005; Amodio and Frith, 2006; Frith and Frith,
2006). These findings can be interpreted as observers empathiz-
ing more with sentient than with automated beings. This claim
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is corroborated with the observation that robotic faces elicited
stronger activation in three gyri associated with the perception of
inanimate objects and automated motion—the medial fusiform,
the lingual, and mid temporal gyri (see Beauchamp et al., 2002).
In a similar study by Perani et al. (2001), positron emission
tomography (PET) was used to record the neural responses of
participants whilst they observed scenes of a hand grasping vari-
ous geometrical objects. Responses to scenes involving a real hand
were compared to those evoked when the same scenes were ren-
dered in 3D virtual reality or 2D movie clips. Results showed
that observation of the real and virtual hands was associated with
greater activation in the inferior temporal cortices and the right
inferior parietal cortex. These are regions that have been impli-
cated, respectively, in the perceptual representation of actions and
motor planning (e.g., Decety, 1996; Decety et al., 1997), and these
stronger activations may reflect greater sensitivity to more realis-
tic depictions of behavior. Finally, when the same brain regions
are activated by live-action and computer-animated behavior,
overall activation is stronger for live-action images (Mar et al.,
2007).
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The findings described above demonstrate that classical attention
paradigms can not only underestimate effects but may also fail
to reveal aspects of human cognition. Throughout this review we
have pointed out cases in which important theoretical advances in
visual cognition have been made by implementing social interac-
tion into experimental manipulations. In the remainder of this
article, we focus on one such phenomenon that until recently
has been the exclusive domain of developmental researchers, but
which is now enjoying increased interest within our own disci-
pline. We propose that a recent development concerning the ToM
phenomenon is perfectly suited to experiments employing real
social interaction.
Theory of Mind is the ability to impute mental states to one-
self and to others. Although the concept was originally employed
in the context of animal cognition (Premack and Woodruff,
1978), a number of developmental psychologists applied the idea
to human infants (e.g., Wimmer and Perner, 1983). Indeed,
ToM has now been applied within various contexts including,
for instance, schizophrenia (Harrington et al., 2005), autism
(Baron-Cohen, 2000), Alzheimer’s disease (Gregory et al., 2002),
decision-making (Torralva et al., 2007), and evolutionary psy-
chology (Povinelli and Preuss, 1995). Real person interaction
studies have been employed in work on ToM. For instance, Stuss
et al. (2001) examined the ability of frontal lobe patients to infer
the visual experience of others; that is, to perspective take. Rather
than depict an individual on a computer monitor, the patients
were asked to consider the perspective of a real person who was
seated opposite. Using both depicted and real person interac-
tion, Rilling et al. (2004) examined whether economical decision
making in conjunction with another individual is subserved by
cortical areas known to be involved in ToM (e.g., anterior paracin-
gulate cortex and posterior superior temporal sulcus). Not only
did Rilling et al. find this to be the case but the activation observed
was greater when the decision maker was interacting with a real
person.
Although adult humans are adept at considering others’ men-
tal states when required to do so, a number of authors have
recently argued that ToM attributions occur automatically. That
is, without conscious effort. Evidence for automatic ToM has
come from a number of different paradigms including gaze cue-
ing (Nuku and Bekkering, 2008; Teufel et al., 2009, 2010a,b).
Gazing agents have been employed in the context of ToM because
when a person looks to a location, a mental state such as inten-
tion can be assumed to be occurring. As Calder et al. (2002)
point out, gaze implies that the person may have some intention
or goal toward a fixated object. Similarly, Nuku and Bekkering
(2008) argued that gaze cueing occurs because the observer infers
that the agent is physically able to attend to the target. They
based their conclusion on results from a gaze cueing procedure in
which the targets would or would not be visible to the agent from
his vantage point. The authors found larger cueing effects when
the targets were visible to the agent. This clearly suggests that
inferring the agent’s mental state (i.e., seeing versus not seeing)
influenced the degree to which the agent shifted the observer’s
attention.
Langton (2009), however, has urged caution in concluding
that mental state attribution modulates gaze cueing. For instance,
objects that have no mental state (e.g., a glove) but which incor-
porate a pair of eyes are effective in shifting attention toward
the “looked-at” direction (e.g., Quadflieg et al., 2004). Moreover,
Cole et al. (2011b) found that gaze cueing was not influenced
according to whether the inducing agent had their view of a
peripheral target blocked or not. These findings suggest that gaze
cueing is largely controlled by bottom-up mechanisms with lit-
tle contribution from higher processes that are responsible for
mental state attribution.
Apperly et al. (2006) have also examined whether ToM can
occur automatically. Adult participants were shown a video
sequence in which an agent marked a box that she knew con-
tained an object. After she was seen to leave the room, a sec-
ond agent then secretly placed the marker on a different box,
meaning that when she returned, the first agent would hold a
false belief about which box contained the object. Participants
were then given true/false statements assessing their own per-
spective (e.g., “the object is in the left box”) or occasionally
that of the female agent (“she thinks the object is in the left
box”). Apperly et al. reasoned that if participants automatically
infer and encode another’s perspective then judgments about
the agent’s beliefs should be made as quickly as are judgments
about their own. Results showed, however, that participants
were relatively slow to indicate the agent’s belief when unex-
pectedly asked to do so. This therefore challenges the notion
that ToM can occur automatically. By contrast, German et al.
(2004) have provided support for the automatic ToM hypothe-
sis using neuroimaging. They found that brain areas known to
be concerned with inferring another person’s intentions (medial
prefrontal, inferior frontal, and temporoparietal cortex; Frith and
Frith, 2006) are also recruited when participants view videos
of social situations but are not required to make judgments
about mental states; a phenomenon the authors refer to as auto-
matic engagement of the intentional stance. Given that the issues
relating to the automaticity of ToM are, by definition, concerned
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with the attribution of mental states to real people, we suggest
that the real-person interaction paradigm we have advocated in
this review would appear particularly suited to its investigation.
Furthermore, the present review shows how much more sensitive
the paradigm can be to cognitive phenomena.
CONCLUSIONS
In this review we have emphasized how real-person social interac-
tion research can yield very different results when compared with
paradigms in which the social context is merely depicted. Indeed,
new information concerning visual cognition is being derived
from themethod. It is clear from the work described in this review
that a fresh insight into human cognitive abilities can be gained
from experiments that allow for more realistic social interaction.
The development of such paradigms is particularly timely given
the burgeoning interest in issues such as ToM and automatic
perspective taking. Indeed, we suggest that if any debate within
cognition could benefit from real-person interaction paradigms
it is this. In the same way as processes underlying attentional ori-
enting and IOR can be elucidated during social interaction with
other people, one might hypothesize that those underlying per-
ception of others’ thoughts, intentions, goals and actions might
also be better understood. The adoption of such an approach can
only increase our understanding of these fascinating processes.
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